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MERGING COMPARATIVE FAULT WITH
STRICT LIABILITY ACTIONS IN NORTH
DAKOTA: IN SEARCH OF A NEW DAY
*WILLIAM A. VAINISI
I. INTRODUCTION
In the not too distant past, legal theorists were waging a fierce
war on the subject of comparative fault. I The battleground was the
American tort system and attorneys for plaintiffs and defendants
were vying for the spoils. It is clear from an examination of the case
law and statutes across the country that a true winner has finally
emerged in the dispute. After receiving a less than warm reception
in the 1960's,2 forty-three states currently adhere to some form of
comparative fault in negligence cases. 3 Thus, not only is it safe to
*B.A. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1979: J.D.. DePaul University College of
Law, 1982, Assistant Counsel, National Association of Independent Insurers: Associate Professor of
Business Law, Harper College.
1. The term "comparative fault" is being used in an effort to avoid the confusing semantic
difficulties which result when such terms as "comparative negligence,.' ''comparative causation,"
and "comparative responsibility" are used interchangeably. However, the term "comparative
negligence" will be used when referring to state statutes that deal with this concept in negligence
actions.
2. Until 1969 only seven states had adopted comparative negligence principles: Arkansas (ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (1979)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1984)); Maine (ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, S 156 (1980)); Mississippi (MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972)); Nebraska
(NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1979));
Wisconsin (Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (1983)). See generally V. SCHWvARTZ, COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE (1974).
3. See Appendix, infra.
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say that the protagonists of comparative fault have won the war,
but also that this concept has become a staple of the American Civil
Justice system.
4
Before the dust has had a chance to settle on the comparative
fault war, another conflict is being waged involving identical
combatants. The subject of this new battle is whether to introduce
comparative fault principles into strict liability actions. 5 Much
rhetoric has been bandied back and forth between the two sides,
but the substantive arguments have fallen neatly into place. On the
one hand, opponents of the comparative fault and strict liability
merger cite the so-called "apples and oranges" theory, 6 which
states that since strict liability is not predicated on negligence or
fault, it is illogical to use plaintiff's conduct to lessen the liability of
the defendant.7 On the other hand, supporters of this merger assert
that the distinction between strict liability cases and negligence
actions is simply a semantic game and that the true issue in these
cases is fault, regardless of the plaintiff's theory of recovery. 8
Consequently, these advocates find it completely consistent to
decrease a defendant's liability in a products liability case by the
amount of fault attributable to the plaintiff.
Although the debate on this new aspect of the comparative
fault war is far from over, certain conclusions have already beeyn
drawn. To date, the "pro-merger" forces have gotten the best of
the fracas. The high courts of thirteen states have extended
comparative fault principles to strict liability actions. 9 Further, five
4. See Appendix, infra.
5. See Fischer, Products Liability - Applicability of Comparative Negligence, 43 Mo. L. REV. 431
(1978): Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault - Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60
MARqU.-TrE L. REV. 297 (1977).
6. See Twerski, supra note 5.
7. Kinard v. Coats Co., Inc., 37 Colo. App. 555, -, 553 P.2d 835, 837 (1976). The court
slatctI as follows:
Products liability under 5 402A does not rest upon negligence principles, but rather is
prIenised on the concept of enterprise liability for casting a defective product into the
sitrcait of commerce .... Thus, the focus is upon the nature of the product, and the
(nsutier's reasonable expectations with regard to that product, rather than on the
conduct either of the manufacturer or of the person injured because of the product.
Id. See also Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974); Seay v. Chrysler Corp.,
93 Wash. 2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382(1980).
8. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978);
Pinto, Comparative Responsibility - An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 45 Is. COUNSELJ. 115, 115 (1978).
9. Those states which have merged strict liability with comparative fault are Alaska (Butaud
V. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976)); California (Daly v.
(;cneral Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr., 380 (1978)); Florida (West v.
(aticrpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1976)); Illinois (Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 97 Ill.2d
104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983)); Kansas (Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788
(1980)): Minnesota (Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977)); New Hampshire
(Reid v. Spadone Mach. Co., 119 N.H. 457, 404 A.2d 1094 (1979)); New Jersey (Suter v. San
Angehl Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979)); North Dakota (Day v. General
Mototrs Corp., 345 N.W.2d 349 (N.D. 1984)); Oregon (Wilson v. B.F. Goodrich, 292 Or. 626, 642
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other jurisdictions have effected the merger by statute, ° and the
federal courts have interpreted the laws of three more states as
providing for a marriage of the doctrines.'I This is not to assert that
a total victory has been achieved by the proponents of the extension
of comparative fault,12 but the clear trend in jurisdictions that have
considered this question is to merge comparative concepts into
strict liability cases. 13
Recently, a collateral issue has appeared in the comparative
fault merger battle. This issue is whether the judiciary should be
obligated to abide by the principles of any existing comparative
fault statutes in the respective states if the courts continue to join
comparative fault with strict liability. This dilemma could not be
better illustrated than in two recent North Dakota Supreme Court
cases, Day v. General Motors Corp., 14 and Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales
and Service, Inc.5 These companion decisions stand for the
proposition that North Dakota will adhere to the pure form of
comparative fault in strict liability actions.16 These decisions
directly conflict with the public policy behind the existing North
Dakota statute 7 which calls for a modified form of comparative
P.2d 644 (1982)); Texas (General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977) overruled,
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. 1984)); Utah (Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand
Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981)); Wisconsin (Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55
(1967)).
10. Those states which have effected the merger of strict liability with comparative fault by
statute are Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to -1765 (1979)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. .14, 156 (1980)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2949 (West Supp. 1985)); New
York (N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAWS 5 1411 (McKinney 1976)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
4.22.05 and 4.22.015 (Supp. 1985)). See also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1984). Section
604.01 is a codification of the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Busch v. Busch Constr.,
Inc. SeeBusch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977).
11. The federal courts of three jurisdictions have .predicted that, given the question of whether
to combine strict liability with comparative fault, the high courts of these states would construct the
merger. Those cases are Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D.
Idaho 1976); Edwards v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975) (Miss.); Zahrte v.
Sturm, Ruger & Co., 498 F. Supp. 389 (D. Mont. 1980).
12. States which have refused to conduct a merger of strict liability with comparative fault are
Colorado (Kinard v. Coats Co*., Inc., 37 Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835 (1976)); Oklahoma
(Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974)); and Washington (Seaky v.
Chrysler Corp., 93 Wash. 2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382 (1980)).
13. See Razook, Merging Comparative Fault and Strict Products Liability: The Case for Judicial
Innovation, 20 AM. Bus. L.J. 511, 514 (1983).
14. 345 N.W.2d 349 (N.D. 1984).
15. 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D. 1984).
16. Day v. General Motors Corp., 345 N.W.2d 349, 357 (N.D. 1984); Mauch v.
Manufacturers Sales and Service, Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 348 (N.D. 1984).
17. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975). Section 9-10-07 provides as follows:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal
representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person
or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence of the person against
whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion
to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering. The court may, and
when requested by either party shall, direct the jury to find separate special verdicts
determining the amount of damages and the percentage of negligence attributable to
each party; and the court shall then reduce the amount of such damages in proportion
to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering. When there are two
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fault 18 in negligence actions.
This Article will briefly describe the opponents in this merger
battle against the backdrop of recent judicial thought on the subject
as well as analyze the ramifications of the Day and Mauch cases as
they apply to North Dakota attorneys and litigants. Finally, this
article will suggest various solutions to the problems presented by
these two decisions.
II. THE CURRENT WINNERS AND LOSERS
The Day and Mauch cases left many unanswered questions.
Before examining some of the effects of these decisions, it is
necessary to explore the experiences of other states that have either
ignored or followed existing comparative fault statutes when
merging this concept with strict products liability. In Dippel v.
Sciano"9 the Wisconsin Supreme Court became the first tribunal to
grapple with the question of how to reconcile a comparative fault
statute that applies to negligence actions with the possible extension
of the comparative fault defense to strict products liability. The
court in Dippel found that strict liability actions are "akin to
negligence per se" and specifically adopted the doctrine of
comparative fault for use in strict products liability cases.
20
or more persons who are jointly liable, contributions to awards shall be in proportion
to the percentage of negligence attributable to each: provided, however, that each
shall remain jointly and severally liable for the whole award. Upon the request of any
party, this section shall be read by the court to the jury and the attorneys representing
the parties may comment to thejury regarding this section.
18. The forms of comparative negligence vary from state to state, but can be categorized into
four basic types:
1) Pure. This form allows the plaintiff to recover damages reduced only in proportion
to the amount they were deemed due to his own fault, up to the point where his or
her conduct was the sole cause of the damages.
See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858
(1975); N.Y. Ctv. PR~c. LAW § 1411-13 (McKinney 1976).
2) Modified - "Less Than" or 49"% System. This scheme allows the plaintiff to
recover damages, reduced by the percentage of his or her fault, so long as that
conduct in proportion to the total negligent conduct is less than that of the
defendant.
SeeARK. STAT. ANN. 5 27-1763 to -1765 (1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111
(1973 & Supp. 1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1976).
3) Modified - "Not Greater Than" or 50% System. This form allows the plaintiff to
recover proportionately reduced damages so long as his or her comparative
contribution to the total negligence causing the injury is not greater than that of the
defendant.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572 h (West 1985); TEX. REV. CIy. STAT.
ANN. art. 2212a(l) (Vernon Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. 5 895.045 (1983).
4) "Slight Versus Gross. " This mode allows the plaintiff to recover proportionately
reduced damages only when his or her negligence is slight in comparison to the
gross negligence of the defendant.
See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 20-9-2
(1979).
19. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
20. Id. at 459, 155 N.W.2d at 64.
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Ultimately, though, the court had to consider the manner in which
the respective faults of plaintiffs and defendants would be
compared. By summarily ruling that Wisconsin's comparative
fault statute now applied to strict products liability, the court made
it eminently clear that the legislature intended all comparison of
fault, whether in negligence or strict liability actions, to be
conducted within the realm of the current statute.
Ten years after the Dippel decision, the Minnesota Supreme
Court in Busch v. Busch Construction, Inc.21 addressed this same
problem. In adopting the comparative fault concept for strict
products liability actions, the court reasoned as follows:
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Dippel v. Sciano . . .
adopted a cause of action for strict liability in tort under
Restatement, Torts 2d, § 402A. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court further held that its comparative negligence statute
applied to such actions. In Marier v. Memorial Rescue . . .
we held that our adoption of the Wisconsin comparative
negligence statute presumed our adoption of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's interpretations of the statute
up to that point. We therefore adopt the Wisconsin rule
that the comparative negligence statute applies in actions
brought on a § 402A theory.... 22
It is important at this juncture to note that the court's
reasoning in Dippel that likened section 402A actions to negligence
per se has been criticized by more than one author. 23 Further,
although the court in Busch agreed with the Wisconsin view that
comparative fault principles should be applied to strict products
liability actions, the Minnesota court refused to accept the
negligence per se analogy. 24 However, these considerations cloud
the arguments and concepts espoused here. The clear trend is in
favor of the merger of comparative fault principles with strict
products liability actions. 25 Thus it is more important to examine
not the vehicle by which the judiciary is effecting this merger, but
the type of comparative fault that is being adopted as well as the
manner in which this scheme is being reconciled with existing
statutes dealing with shared liability.
Wisconsin and Minnesota are obviously not the only two
21. 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977).
22. Id. at 393.
23. See, e.g., Twerski, supra note 5, at 319; Fischer, supra note 5, at 439.
24. 262 N.W.2d at 393-394.
25. See note 13, supra.
19851
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states that have effectively addressed the comparative fault/strict
liability merger questions. The courts or legislatures of at least
twenty-one states have already debated and decided this issue. 26 In
additionto Wisconsin and Minnesota, the high courts of eleven
other states have grappled with this merger question. Of these
states, Alaska, 27 California, 28 Florida, 29 and Illinois 30 adopted by
judicial fiat the pure form of comparative fault for negligence
actions. Thus, it was easy for these tribunals to extend this judicial
reasoning to strict products liability actions. 31 These decisions do
not present precedent against which the Day and Mauch matters can
be analyzed, however, since none of these tribunals reconciled an
existing comparative fault statute with the decision to extend this
doctrine into strict liability actions.
Of those states that have had to deal with prior legislative
pronouncements in the comparative area, three state supreme
courts, in addition to Wisconsin and Minnesota, have extended the
existing comparative fault statute to strict products liability actions.
These states, Oregon, 32 New Jersey, 33 and Kansas, 34 all followed
the approach of the court in Dippel in conducting this merger. All
three jurisdictions had comparative negligence statutes that
followed the modified approach. 
35
The foregoing cases are not put forth to suggest that the North
Dakota Supreme Court is the only court to reject an existing
comparative negligence statute for use in strict products liability
actions. In Day and Mauch, the North Dakota Supreme Court relied
heavily upon General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins. 36 In Hopkins the Texas
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether to merge
26. See notes 9, 10, and 12, supra.
27. See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975).
28. See Li v, Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
29. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
30. See Alvis v. Ribar, 85 11. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981).
3 1. See Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc. 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Daly v.
General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); West v.
Caerpillar Tractor Co. Inc., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc., 97 Ill.2d
104, 454 N.E.2d 197(1983).
32. See Baccelleri v. Hyster Co., 287 Or. No. 3,597 P.2d 351 (1979).
33. See Surer v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
:34. ee Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788 (1980).
:35. See OR. REv. STAT. S 18.470 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-5.1 to -5.3 (West Supp.
1985): KAN STAT. ANN. S 60 -2 58a (1983).
36. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977) overruled, Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414
(Tcx. 1984). See also Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 428 (Tex. 1984). In Duncan the
Texas Supreme Court stated:
We therelore hold that in products liability cases in which at least one defendant is
foundt liable on a theory other than negligence, the plaintiff's damages shall be reduced
only by the percentage of causation attributed to the plaintiff, regardless of how large




comparative fault with strict liability and, if so, whether to facilitate
such a fusing through the current comparative negligence statute.
Upon deciding the first question in the affirmative, the Texas
tribunal went on to assert that:
This . . . is not to be confused with the statutory scheme
of modified comparative negligence which bars all
recovery to the plaintiff if his negligence is greater than
the negligence of the parties against whom recovery is
sought. . . . The defense in a products liability case,
where both defect and misuse contribute to cause the
damaging event, will limit the plaintiff's recovery to that
portion of his damages equal to the percentage of the
cause contributed by the product defect.
37
Thus, the Texas court became the leader in effecting the
merger of comparative fault with strict products liability by overtly
rejecting the existing comparative negligence statute and
employing the pure form of comparative fault. Unfortunately, the
Hopkins court did not detail the reasoning behind this decision. One
author, 38 however, seems to think that the Texas tribunal did not
feel bound by the Texas comparative negligence statute because
that particular enactment was limited in its words to negligence
actions. 39 It is more likely that the real reason behind this decision
was an ideological belief on the part of the Texas court that an "all
or nothing" approach in strict products liability cases would go
against the very grain and fiber of the doctrine of strict liability.
Subsequent to the Hopkins decision, the supreme court of Utah
addressed the identical question. In Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 4
0
the Utah high court, like the Texas tribunal, employed the pure
form of comparative fault in strict products liability cases in
complete disregard of the state's modified comparative negligence
statute. 4 1 The court in Mulherin, however, offered a more specific
37. 548 S.W.2d at 352 (citation omitted).
38. See Razook, supra note 13, at 519.
39. See TEX. REV. CtV. STAT. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1985).
40. 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981).
41. See UTAH CODEANN. 5 78-27-37 (1977). Section 78-27-37 states as follows:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal
representative to recover damages for negligence or gross negligence resulting in death
or in injury to person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the negligence
or gross negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages
allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable
to the person recovering. As used in this act, "contributory negligence" includes
"assumption of the risk. "
19851
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rationale for its decision. Like the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Dippel, the Utah court felt constrained by the existing comparative
negligence statute, but in the opposite direction. Rather than
viewing the comparative statute as a barrier to its judicial freedom,
the court felt that because the comparative negligence statute dealt
with negligence actions, its application should be confined to such
matters.
4 2
All of the courts that have been analyzed thus far have
exercised a form of judicial creativity in one form or another. The
court in Dippel and its progeny merged comparative fault with strict
products liability while remaining within the realm of the existing
public policy on shared fault. On the other hand, the theory of
Hopkins, to which North Dakota now subscribes, led the way in
joining comparative fault with strict liability while at the same time
ignoring or rejecting all legislative pronouncements on the matter.
At this point in time, with two so divergent standpoints on the
issue, one is led to the following question: Which approach to this
problem will best serve lawyers and litigants throughout the
country in general and, in particular, the State of North Dakota?
Before answering this question, it is necessary to explore and
critique the Day and Mauch cases to decipher the direction of North
Dakota public policy. Then various solutions will be offered to
alleviate the problems caused by these cases.
III. THE DAY AND MAUCH SCENARIOS
In Day4 3 the North Dakota Supreme Court was asked to
answer various certified questions relating to the applicability of
comparative fault to a strict products liability action.4 4 The dispute
arose when the plaintiff, Day, fell asleep while driving his
42. Mulhcrin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1303 (Utah 1981). In Mulherin the court
stated as follows: "The legislative enactment of comparative negligence principles . . . does not
control this case since that statute only applies to the defense of contributory negligence in an action
'to recover damages for negligence or gross negligence ....... "Id. Cf Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978) (evidence indicating that plaintiff was more than 50%0
responsible for his injury may support ajury verdict in favor of the defendant manufacturer).
43. 345 N.W.2d 349 (N.D. 1984).
44. Day v. General Motors Corp., 345 N.W.2d 349, 351 (N.D. 1984). The United States
District Court certified the following questions of law to the North Dakota Supreme Court:
1) In a personal injury action against the manufacturer of a product wherein the
plaintiff is seeking damages under a theory of strict liability based on an alleged
design defect which plaintiff claims enhanced the injury, should plaintiff's
percentage of fault be determined and applied so as to reduce or, as the case may
be, defeat plaintiff's recovery?
2) If plaintiff's percentage of fault is relevant, should the determination include both
plaintiff's accident producing fault and injury enhancing fault so as to reduce or, as
the case may be, defeat plaintiff's recovery?
3) If comparative fault is applicable, should it be applied so as to allow plaintiff a
[VOL. 61:7
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automobile. 45 The car veered into a ditch and overturned. 46 Day
was ejected from the automobile during the roll-over and sustained
injuries that rendered him quadriplegic. 47 Day sued General
Motors alleging that the car had been equipped with an
unreasonably dangerous or negligently designed door latch. 48 The
plaintiff claimed that the defective door latch was depressed during
the roll-over and caused Day to be ejected from the car. 49 It was
stipulated at trial that Day had not fastened his seat belt or shoulder
harness. 50 It was further uncontroverted that the plaintiff had not
locked the doors from the inside and that, had he done so, the
outside door handle could not have been depressed.
51
The Day court analyzed the relevant case law relating to the
issue of whether to apply comparative fault principles to a products
liability action. Interestingly enough, the court's examination of
this problem flowed not from the legislative intent of the North
Dakota comparative fault statute, but from an analysis of the
precedents of other states on the subject. The court concluded that
since the comparative fault statute was enacted in 1973 and strict
products liability was judicially adopted in 1974, a strong
presumption was created that the legislature did not consider strict
liability when the comparative law was passed. 52 That conclusion
was reached, however, only after the court decided that the North
Dakota comparative statute was "unreconcilable, incompatible
and not in harmony with the basic concepts of products liability or
strict liability. "5 Further, the court first made its finding that the
pure form of comparative fault would 85e used in strict products
liability cases, and then tried to reconcile this determination with
the existing modified-type statute. 54 Because the court chose to
adopt pure comparative fault for products liability actions, the end
result obviously would be a finding that this scheme was
inconsistent with the existing statute. Thus, the court made a
convenient end run around existing public policy in order to rid
recovery even though plaintiff's percentage of fault is found to be as great or




47. Id. at 351-352.




52. Id. at 354.
53. Id. at 354 n.3.
54. Id. at 357. The court stated, "Accordingly, we will apply comparative negligence on a pure
form basis to products liability and strict liability actions. Having reached this conclusion, we must
now determine ifNDCC 5 9-10-07 fulfills or satisfies this requirement. " Id.
1985]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
itself of any constraints placed upon it by the legislature. The court
in Day established the following guidelines for future North Dakota
products liability actions:
Contributing causal negligence or fault shall not bar a
recovery in products liability or strict liability actions, but
the damages shall be diminished in proportion to the
amount of plaintiff's causal negligence or fault.
55
The Mauch decision, 56 decided on the same day, presents a
similar situation. Kathleen Mauch was attempting to pull-start one
tractor with another using a "Mr. Big Tow" nylon rope. 57 She was
driving the pulling tractor when the hook attached to the stalled
tractor broke, causing the nylon rope to recoil with the hook still
attached to it.58 The mechanism crashed through the windshield of
the tractor striking Mauch and causing serious injuries. 59 The
plaintiff sued the manufacturer, Manufacturers Sales & Service,
Inc., alleging, among other things, that the nylon rope was
defective and in an unreasonably dangerous condition and that the
defendants were also negligent in not warning her of the recoiling
tendencies of the rope. 60 The manufacturer defended the case by
asserting that the plaintiff negligently caused her injuries by placing
the hook in an improper position for such a towing procedure.
61
The trial court decided that there was no distinction between
the negligence and the strict liability theories of recovery and
refused to give instructions to the jury regarding the latter. 62 Thus,
the jury considered the case solely on the negligence action and
returned a special verdict finding the proximate cause of the
plaintiffs injury fifty percent attributable to Mauch and fifty
percent attributable to the defendant. 63 Consequently, according to
North Dakota's comparative fault statute, 64 the plaintiff was not
entitled to recover since her negligence was as great as that of the
defendant. 65 The case then went to the North Dakota Supreme
Court on numerous issues. 66 Most important, however, was
55. Id.
56. 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D. 1984).







64. See supra note 17.
65. 345 N.W.2d at 341.
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whether the plaintiff's negligence was a defense in the strict
products liability action.
67
After considering similar precedent to that weighed in Day, the
Mauch court announced that:
[W]e hold that where an unreasonably dangerous defect
of a product and the plaintiff's assumption of risk or
unforeseeable misuse of the product are concurring
proximate causes of the injury suffered, the trier of fact
must compare those concurring causes to determine the
respective percentages by which each contributed [to the
plaintiff's injury] . . . . We further hold that the
comparison of causations under a products-liability claim
should be on a pure comparative-causation basis, unlike
the statutory scheme of modified comparative negligence
under Section 9-10-07, N.D.C.C.
68
Like the Day decision, Mauch is equally wrought with
confusion. In arriving at its threshold decision to extend
comparative fault to strict products liability, the court stated that
because ordinary contributory negligence principles are not
relevant to a products liability action under section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 69  the current North Dakota
67. Id.
68. Id. at 348 (citations omitted).
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A provides as follows:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id. Comment n to the above section states:
n. Contributory negligence. Since the liability with which this Section deals is not
based upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict
liability cases (see § 524) applies. Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a
defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in
the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand
the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably
proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly passes under the name of
assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict
liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger,
and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is injured
by it, he is barred from recovery.
Id., comment n.
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comparative statute is inapplicable to this situation.7 o However, the
court then reasoned that the legislative adoption of the comparative
doctrine for negligence actions made it "fair and just to all
parties ' ' 71 to merge comparative fault with strict products liability
claims.72 The court then went on to rebuff the existing statute by
adopting the pure form of comparative fault. 
7 3
This confusing scheme of justification leads to two simple
questions: (1) How can the court specifically rule out the
applicability of the North Dakota comparative negligence statute to
strict products liability cases, while at the same time using this same
law for justification of its extension of comparative fault to the
liability without fault doctrine; and (2) upon using the North
Dakota statute as a public policy justification for its decision on the
one hand, why would the court then choose to select a totally
different policy stance by choosing the pure form of comparative
fault?
In his recent article analyzing the North Dakota Supreme
Court case of Bartels v. City of Williston, 74 Professor Larry Kraft
attempted to delineate the effects of this case on future North
Dakota tort law questions. 75 Professor Kraft asserted that the North
Dakota Supreme Court was not bound by either the Dippel or Busch
decisions with respect to the comparative fault/strict liability
merger question. 76 His reasoning is based on a declaration that
because North Dakota had not adopted section 402A 77 when the
Minnesota comparative negligence statute was accepted, the
existing Minnesota and Wisconsin case law dealing with the
statute, of which Dippel and Busch are included, would not be
binding on the North Dakota Supreme Court. 78 Although
Professor Kraft's chronology regarding adoption of comparative
concepts in Wisconsin, Minnesota, and North Dakota is correct,7 9
it is an avoidance of the issue to state that the North Dakota
Supreme Court was justified in ignoring the Dippel and Busch
decisions simply because section 402A had not yet been adopted
when the comparative statute had been promulgated. Professor
Kraft seems to feel that the promulgation of section 402A is pivotal
70. 345 N.W.2d at 347-48.
71. Id. at 348.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. 276 N.W.2d 113 (N.D. 1979).
75. See Kraft, The North Dakota Equity for Tortfeasors Struggle Judicial Actions o. Legislative Over-
Reaction, 56 N.D.L. REV. 67 
(1980).
76. Id. at 94.
77. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
78. Kraft, supra note 75, at 94.
79. Id. at 94 n. 102.
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to an extension of the comparative negligence statute to strict
products liability cases8" and, based on the assertions put forth by
the court in Day, it is obvious that the North Dakota Supreme
Court agreed with his analysis.
81
The analysis espoused by Professor Kraft, whether or not
relied upon by the North Dakota Supreme Court, is faulty for two
reasons. First, the assertion that since North Dakota had not
adopted section 402A when the Wisconsin-Minnesota comparative
negligence statute was enacted, its courts should not be con-
strained by the cases interpreting this law, hides behind a very
strong judicial trend in this country. Starting in 1962 with the
California Supreme Court decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.,8 2 state after state adopted either section 402A or its
equivalent. By 1973, the year North Dakota enacted its
comparative negligence statute, no less than thirty-one states had
accepted section 402A8 3 or its kin. 84 Thus, to make Professor
Kraft's argument, one would have to assume that a cause of action
under the strict products liability doctrine was a fledgling concept.
80. See id. at 94-95.
81. See Day v. General Motors Corp., 345 N.W.2d 349, 353 (N.D. 1984).
82. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
84. States that adopted § 402A are: Alabama (Atkins v. American Motors Corp., 335 So. 2d
134 (Ala. 1976)); Arizona (O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968));
Colorado (Brandford v. Bendix-Westinghouse Auto. Air Brake Co., 33 Colo. App. 225, 517 P.2d
406 (1973)); Connecticut (Wachtel v. Rosol, 159 Conn. 496, 271 A.2d 84 (1970)); Florida (West v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976)); Hawaii (Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car
Corp., 52 Haw. 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970)); Idaho (Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518
P.2d 857 (1974)); Indiana (Perfection Paint and Color Co. v, Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 106, 258
N.E.2d 681 (1970)); Iowa (Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa
1970)); Kansas (Brooks v. Dietz, 218 Kan. 698, 545 P.2d 1104 (1976)); Kentucky (Dealers
Transport Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1966)); Maryland (Phipps v. General
Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976)); Missouri (Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445
S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969)); Mississippi (State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss.
1966)); Montana (Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mt. 506, 513 P.2d 268
(1973)); New Hampshire (Buttrick v. Arthur Lessand & Sons, Inc., 110 N.H. 336, 260 A.2d 111
(1969)); New Mexico (Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972)); North Dakota
(Johnson v. American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974)); Oklahoma (Kirkland v. General
Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974)); Oregon (Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435
P.2d 806 (1967)); Pennsylvania (Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966)); Rhode Island
(Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 109 R.I. 176, 283 A.2d 255 (1971)); Texas (Darryl v..Ford Motor
Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969)); Vermont (Zaleskie v. Joyce, 133 Vt. 150, 333 A.2d 110 (1975));
Washington (Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969)); Wisconsin (Dipple
v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967)).
84. States that have adopted a rule of strict liability for detective products which is equivalent
to § 402A are Alaska (Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970)); California (Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962)); Delaware (Martin
v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581 (Del. 1976)); District of Columbia (Cottom v. McGuire
Funeral Service, Inc., 262 A.2d 807 (D.C. 1970)); Illinois (Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d
612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965)); Louisiana (Weber v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co. of New York, 259 La.
599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971)); Michigan (Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 133
N.W.2d 129 (1965)); Minnesota (Kerr v. Corning Glass Works, 284 Minn. 155, 169 N.W.2d 587
(1969)); Nebraska (Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971)); Nevada
(Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 470 P.2d 135 (1970)); NewJersey (Santor v. A and M
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965)); New York (Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d
330, 298 N.E.2d 622 (1973)); Ohio (Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 277, 218
N.E.2d 185 (1966)); Tennessee (Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.240 (1966)).
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Clearly this was not the case in 1973. Strict products liability either
under section 402A or its progeny had become a way of life by the
time the North Dakota legislature enacted comparative
negligence. 85 Furthermore, the North Dakota Supreme Court
accepted section 402A one year after the comparative negligence
statute was passed. 6 Therefore, the view that the absence of the
adoption of section 402A justifies the North Dakota Supreme
Court's disregard of Dippel is weak when analyzed against the
backdrop of judicial trend at the time the legislature was debating
the comparative negligence law.
Second, Professor Kraft indicates that because the judiciary
was the institution that adopted section 402A, "there exists no
questions of judicial interpretation of legislative intent. The court is
free to develop section 402A in any way it sees fit."87 As will be
touched upon later, this type of philosophy has led to the confusion
generated by the Mauch and Day decisions. Rather than engaging in
a "turf battle" between the legislature and judiciary, the Day and
Mauch courts should have attacked this question with the ultimate
goal of protecting products liability litigants. Furthermore, since a
public policy already existed with respect to comparative
negligence, the court should have given deference to this position
rather than seek a way to avoid its effects. It is clearly not the role of
the judiciary to view its function in a vacuum without giving regard
to legislative enactments. Rather, the courts should feel obligated
to work with the legislature to ensure that the tort system is a
workable mix ofjudicial pronouncements and statutory decrees.
North Dakota products liability litigants are now left with a
very confusing and deficient system with which to adjudicate
disputes. This article will next examine the roots of these
deficiencies and will suggest various responses to alleviate the
problems presented by the Day and Mauch decisions.
IV. THE ORIGIN AND DEFICIENCIES OF DAY AND
MAUCH
The ideas and edicts espoused by the courts in Hopkins and
Mulherin and now in Day and Mauch have been well received by
what this author calls the comparative fault "purists." These legal
scholars argue that if such defenses as misuse"8 and assumption of
85. See supra notes 83 -84.
86. SeeJohnson v. American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 1974).
87. Kraft, supra note 75, at 94.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A comment h (1965). Comment h states as follows:
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risk are compared with a defendant's conduct in a strict
products liability action, then such a balancing should be in a pure
manner. 90 This view is grounded in the belief that any remnant of
the "all or nothing" approach of contributory negligence days
violates the very basis of strict liability actions. 91 In other words,
proponents of the pure form of comparative fault in strict products
liability actions feel that a plaintiff should never be totally denied a
recovery due to his or her own conduct. Advocates of this position
also point with favor to the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, which
provides for the pure scheme of comparative fault in strict liability
actions. 92 It should be noted, however, that this model legislation
has yet to be adopted in any state.
As was previously stated, the reasoning which led to the Day
and Mauch decisions confuses the strict products liability area and
represents an opposition to a clear legislative intent in the field. The
threshold objection to the North Dakota Supreme Court's latest
proclamation in the products liability area revolves around the idea
that the existing state comparative negligence statute represents,
generally, the legislative statement in this field. Any judicial ruling
on a sub-issue in this area that varies the already-stated general
legislative design is disruptive and represents a lack of deference for
A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and
consumption. If the injury results from abnormal handling, as where a bottled
beverage is knocked against a radiator to remove the cap, or from abnormal
preparation for use, as where too much salt is added to food, or from abnormal
consumption, as where a child eats too much candy and is made ill, the seller is not
liable.
Id. Generally, this "abnormal handling" which comment h speaks of is known as the "misuse
defense." Alleged product alteration is generally asserted as a "misuse" defense, but in addition, the
manufacturer may assert that at the time of the accident the product had undergone a "substantial
change" from the condition in which it was sold. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 402A (1)(b)
(1965). See generally 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 16A (4) (d) (1984).
89. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965); Mauch, 345 N.W.2d at 347-
48.
90. See Razook, supra note 13 at 520; Kraft, supra note 87, at 98. See also supra note 19 and
accompanying text.
91. See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532
P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Placek v. City
of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979).
92. For a detailed discussion of the entire Uniform Comparative Fault Act, see Wade, Products
Liabity and Plaintiff's Fault - The Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. REV. 373 (1978).
Although this Act will not be reproduced in its entirety here, section 1 of the U.C.F.A. is most
pertinent to this analysis and provides:
a) In an action based upon fault seeking to recover damanges for injury or death to
person or harm to property, any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant
diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages for an
injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault, but does not bar re-
covery. ...
b), "Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless
toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person to
strict tort liability.
Uniform Comparative Fault Act § 1 (1977).
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the clear mandate of the agents of the citizens. There are equally
important criticisms which have even more far-reaching effects on
all the participants in the legal process.
In its opinion in the Mauch case, the North Dakota Supreme
Court tackled the question of whether the plaintiff's ordinary
contributory negligence should be compared against the conduct of
the defendant. In answering this query in the negative, the court
stated that:
We believe the better rationale, and the one we
choose to follow in this case, is that the plaintiff's conduct
should not be scrutinized in ordinary "contributory
negligence" terminology as a defense to a products-lia-
bility claim. . . . The defense which we have previously
recognized in Chesterton . . . of assumption of risk and
unforeseeable misuse are, in our opinion, adequate to
protect a seller or manufacturer from unjust liability in a
case of this type,
93
Thus, the current state of North Dakota personal injury law
finds a modified approach used when comparing the conduct of
plaintiff and defendant in a negligence case while, in strict liability
actions, a pure form is used to analyze the behavior of the litigants.
This may seem like a rather neat and orderly approach; however, it
must be noted that the line of demarcation between simple
contributory negligence and assumption of risk94 or misuse95
becomes very hazy as the contributory acts become more serious.
Further, it must also be acknowledged that most products-related
cases contain multiple theories of recovery, including negligence,
warranty, and strict liability. This being the case, the Mauch and
Day decisions place lawyers and judges in a position in which
they must attempt to draft jury instructions that not only explain
the differences between contributory negligence and strict liability
defenses, but which also cross-reference these ideas with the
different theories of recovery. It is an unenviable task to attempt to
direct jurors to gauge the quality of the litigants' conduct in the
same case under a modified scheme of comparative fault for the
negligence theory and then analyze the same behavior under a pure
comparative format for the strict products liability action. Products
liability cases founded upon several theories of recovery presented a
93. Mauch, 345 N.W.2d at 347.
94. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 61: 7
MERGING COMPARATIVE FAULT
challenge to jurors before the Day and Mauch decisions. The
aftermath of these cases will lend further turmoil to an already
muddled area of the law. The result of the Day and Mauch edicts
will be a proliferation of perplexed juries, trial mistakes, and
appealable issues. Ultimately, the already over-burdened docket of
the appellate court in North Dakota will receive a good work-out
trying to reconcile the Day and Mauch decisions.
Finally, as mentioned above, those legal scholars who are now
celebrating the North Dakota Supreme Court's latest
proclamations in this area feel that the very essence of strict liability
dictates that a plaintiff should never be left without a recovery. 96
The better view, however, is that the present system is unfair to all
litigants and, among other things, forces the accused parties in
strict liability cases to subsidize even the most gross misconduct of
plaintiffs. One result of the Day and Mauch decisions will clearly be
an increase in insurance premiums. As it stands now, there will be
an increase in the cumulative amount of damages paid to products
liability plaintiffs under this new system. Without the opportunity
to foreclose recovery on a claimant whose assumption of the risk or
misuse of a product exceeds the culpability of a defendant, payment
will be made in every instance except the rare situation of total
nonliability. Thus, insurance carriers will be forced to pass these
additional payments on to the policyholders in the form of higher
premiums. This increased cost of doing business will add a factor
toward rendering North Dakota an unattractive place to conduct
commerce.
This author does not intent to portray a sorry situation for the
business community or to suggest that blameworthy actors should
not take responsibility for their respective transgressions and
compensate reasonably innocent parties for the injuries they incur
due to defective products. However, it should not be the aim of
lawmakers, both judicial and legislative, to construct a system that
awards plaintiffs for their own misconduct. In order to have a
credible scheme, a plaintiff's own conduct should at some point
preclude him or her from recovery. Allowing a plaintiff to recover
in every strict products liability case creates an artificial system of
compensation that does not effectively punish wrongdoers at the
same time it repairs victims of defective products. Unfortunately,
North Dakota now has such a system as a result of the Day and
Mauch decisions. The question now must be: What next?
96. See supra text accompanying note 93.
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V. CAN THE DAY BE SAVED?
Since the Day and Mauch decisions, the legislature and
judiciary in North Dakota have been at odds concerning the public
policy surrounding the comparative fault doctrine. The most
important task at this point is the reconciliation of these two
comparative fault systems to ensure fairness to both members of the
bar and litigants involved in products liability actions. The options
that we face are: (1) to leave this format alone and run the risks
discussed in the previous section, or (2) to seek some kind of change
that will facilitate a workable system for tort litigants in North
Dakota.
Having reached the conclusion that the present system is
awkward and unfair, and thus, some change must be effected in the
comparative fault system, the issue turns to an examination of the
alternative(s) available. The most viable means of producing
reform in this area is through a legislative response to the Day and
Mauch opinions.
Having adopted the Wisconsin-Minnesota comparative
negligence statute in 1973, the North Dakota legislature set the
public policy tone with respect to comparative fault principles. The
North Dakota Supreme Court, through its opinions in Day and
Mauch, ignored this tone and reshaped the thinking in the
comparative fault area. However, the court dropped the concept
back into the legislature's lap when it stated:
As we noted in Bartels . . . we find it difficult, if not
impossible, to come up with a rule on contributing fault
or negligence which will do justice in every conceivable
set of facts. Therefore, each case having a different
situation may require modification of legal principles to
assure a just and fair distribution and allocation of fault
(negligence) and damages.
Until appropriate legislation is enacted, we will be obliged
to continue developing the applicable rule of law to assure
fair and equitable results on a case-by-case basis. 97
Not only did the court feel insecure about its decisions in Day
and Mauch, but it also wanted the North Dakota legislature to
address the issue. The court in Day and Mauch recognized that, in
97. Mauch, 345 N.W.2d at 358 (citing Daly v. General Motors, Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d
1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978)) (emphasis added).
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light of cases in other states, a decision on the proposed merger of
comparative fault and strict liability had to be made. The court
indicated, however, that the legislature should make this
determination.
It is very important that the North Dakota legislature take
heed of the petition of the Day and Mauch courts and enact
legislation dealing with the union of strict liability with comparative
fault. Based on the foregoing, it would unmistakably be to the
advantage of the citizens of North Dakota for the legislature to
enact a law that either installs a modified type of comparative fault
in strict products liability or simply amends the current North
Dakota comparative negligence statute98 to a comparative fault law
applicable to strict products liability cases.
The task should be a relatively simple one for the legislature.
An examination of some other states' handling of this issue bears
out this assertion. The State of Idaho, which subscribes to the same
public policy as North Dakota with respect to comparative
negligence, 99 has included a separate provision dealing with shared
fault in its product liability statute. 100 Of further importance to
North Dakota, in 1978 the Minnesota legislature amended its
comparative fault statute to bring it in line with the aforementioned
Busch decision. 10 ' Subdivision 1(a) of that Minnesota law now
provides that the modified form of comparative fault applies to
"acts or omissions . . . that subject a person to strict tort
liability.' ' 0 2 Thus, the North Dakota legislature has plenty of
precedent to either enact a product liability statute that calls for the
use of modified comparative fault in such actions, or amend the
existing current comparative negligence statute to include the
institution of modified comparative fault principles in strict liability
actions. Of course, should the legislature opt for the latter solution
to this problem, it would be necessary to change the comparative
negligence statute to a comparative fault law. In fact, Professor
Kraft in his aforementioned article alluded to the same possibility
98. See supra note 18.
99. See IDAHO CODE § 6-801 (1979).
100. Id. § 6-1304 (Supp. 1984). Section 6-1304 provides as follows:
Comparative responsibility shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his
legal representative to recover damages for product liability resulting in death or
injury to person or property, if such responsibility was not as great as the responsibility
of tile person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be
diminished in the proportion to the amount of responsibility attributable to the person
recovering.
Id.
101. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1984).
102. Id.
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in his analysis of the available solutions to the strict
liability/comparative fault merger question. 1
03
The public policy with respect to comparative principles was
already set with the adoption of the Wisconsin-Minnesota scheme
in 1973. Thus, in fairness to all those involved in the tort litigation
system, the legislature must pass a measure which uniformly
extends this public policy to the strict liability area.
VI. CONCLUSION
Several wars are in progress in the strict liability/comparative
negligence area. As in most disputes between noted legal scholars,
certain thoughts and positions win out that shape the future of the
future of the law for some time. This skirmish on the comparative
fault battleground is not an exception. It has become evident from
an examination of some of the trends indicated earlier that the
shared fault concept is winning wide acceptance in the strict
products liability area. However, the mere act of uniting
comparative fault with strict liability is not the end of the work for
advocates of this idea. Equally important is the adoption of a
scheme of comparative fault that will enable this marriage to be a
happy one.
The least troublesome and most effective way of implementing
the merger of comparative fault with strict liability is to follow the
same scheme as is used in negligence actions. With respect to North
Dakota, this means an extension of the current comparative
negligence statute to encompass strict liability cases. Although the
Day and Mauch decisions call for the use of pure comparative fault
in such matters, equity and sound law-making principles demand
that these cases be overruled by a legislative enactment extending
the already-stated public policy on the subject.
It is the duty of those entrusted with the representation of the
citizens in North Dakota to ensure that the legal system serves the
populace in the most efficient manner. The issue of the merger of
comparative fault with strict liability gives the legislature the
chance to fire a volley on behalf of the most important contenderin
this legal/theoretical war: the patrons of the North Dakota court
system.
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